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REFLECTIONS ON THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
OF CURRENT NOISE ABATEMENT FINANCING
PROPOSALS
JOHN

R.

BOYER, JR.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on December 23,
1976, promulgated a regulation requiring existing large commercial jet aircraft to comply with noise limits which were formerly
applicable only to aircraft entering service after December 31,
1974.' Compliance with this regulation will cost the airline industry a minimum of approximately one billion dollars. The purpose
of this paper is to discuss the various congressional proposals for
providing financial assistance to the airlines to meet the costs of
financing the noise reductions required by the new noise regulation.
Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act' by passage of the
Aircraft Noise Abatement Acte in 1968. This amendment allows
the FAA to "prescribe and amend standards, rules, and regulations
in order to afford present and future relief and protection to the
public from unnecessary aircraft noise."' The primary response by
the FAA to this extension of its rulemaking authority was the
promulgation of Federal Aviation Rule (FAR) Part 36' in 1969.
Sections of the original FAR Part 36 regulation, applicable to
large commercial jet aircraft,' limited noise emissions of aircraft
of new design only. The preamble to FAR Part 36, however, put
the industry on notice that the FAA also planned to regulate noise
emissions of the then existing jet fleet. The provisions of the
original FAR Part 36 regulation, applicable to large jet aircraft
of new design, require measurements of aircraft noise to be taken
'38 Fed. Reg. 28,020 (1973).
' See note 22 infra.
'The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1301
et seq. (1976), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
4
Aircraft Noise Abatement Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C. S 1431 (1970).
Id.

14 C.F.R. § 36 (1977).
'Turbojet powered civil aircraft over 75,000 pounds in weight.

0
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at three precisely defined reference points,' under specified parameters including such factors as wind velocity, temperature, and

humidity. If an aircraft's emissions of noise exceed the limits set
down in the original FAR Part 36, the aircraft is denied an FAA
certificate of airworthiness,' and thus, is effectively barred from use
within the United States.
In 1973, the FAA amended FAR Part 3610 to further inquire

that newly produced aircraft of older design comply with the
FAR Part 36 noise standards by December 31, 1974.11 On December 23, 1976, the FAA announced a final rule requiring that jet
aircraft built prior to 1975 and designed before 1969 ("older jet
aircraft") comply with the limits imposed by the original FAR
Part 36." The December 23, 1976, amendment, effective January

1, 1977, requires that all civil jet aircraft weighing over 75,000
pounds meet the FAR Part 36 noise limits by January 1, 1983.
It did allow one-half the fleet of four-engine aircraft built prior
to 1975, with low bypass ratio engines, 3 to be operated without
modification until January 1, 1985. If under an approved plan"
new complying replacement aircraft have been ordered, older jet
aircraft other than four-engine jets also may be operated until
1985. A further amendment to FAR Part 36 was promulgated on
March 3, 1977." This amendment imposed even higher noise
standards than those imposed by the January 1, 1977 amend'The reference points are "sideline," "approach," and "takeoff." These locations are explained in 14 C.F.R. § 36.101 (1977) and 14 C.F.R. § 36 Appendices
A and C (1977).
'Airworthiness certificates are issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970).
1038 Fed. Reg. 29,574 (1973).
"Id.
"38 Fed. Reg. 28,020 (1973).
13 Low bypass ratio turbojet engines produce substantially more noise than
high bypass ratio engines. Engine bypass ratios have increased with improved
technology. The extended time period allowed for compliance of low bypass four
engine aircraft by the regulation was made in contemplation of removal of a
substantial number of such low bypass ratio engine aircraft from the domestic
fleet, as aircraft powered by such engines compose the oldest segment of the
U.S. fleet.
4 The regulation does not specify what an "approved plan" is, other than that
the aircraft must be ordered and must comply with the FAR part 36 regulations.
See 41 Fed. Reg. 56,055-56,056 (1976).
" 42 Fed. Reg. 12,360 (1977). See also note 72 infra.
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ment for aircraft of new design and for new modified versions of
older jet aircraft designs.
The original congressional grant of authority to regulate aircraft noise was given in 1968. FAR Part 36 did not, however,
become applicable to older jet aircraft until January 1, 1977. As
a result of this seven year delay in regulating the older jet aircraft,
FAR Part 36 has been largely ineffectual and has resulted in only
minimal aircraft noise reduction. Until the January 1, 1977,
amendment, FAR Part 36 was inapplicable to approximately eighty
percent of the U.S. commercial jet fleet."
The FAA justified its failure to initially promulgate a noise rule
applicable to older jet aircraft on its belief that it could not, without further study, promulgate such a regulation within the statutory constraint of the Noise Abatement Act' and that such a noise
rule must be economically practicable.' In 1974 and 1975 increased congressional and public pressure forced the FAA to reconsider its original position, and efforts were made to formulate
a noise rule applicable to the older jet aircraft. 9 The agency then
further delayed promulgation of a noise rule, as it was of the
opinion that some type of financial assistance to the airlines should
accompany a new regulation mandating compliance with FAR
part 36.'
The FAA's caution was certainly justified, as the financial status
of the industry was very weak. During the five year period from
January 1, 1972, to January 1, 1977, the airline industry recorded
'6

See Proposed Directive to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad-

ministration to Promulgate Noise Regulations for Certain Aircraft: Hearings on
H.R. 14027 before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public

Works and Transportation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (testimony of Norman Mineta) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 14027, 1976].
'7 See note 4 supra.
"8This justification is implied in 35 Fed. Reg. 16,980 (1970) and Hearings on
H.R. 14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 1-3.

"'The Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972)
directed federal agencies to carry out the programs within their control in such
a manner as to further that declared policy of the United States to the fullest
extent consistent with their authority under federal law. This statute mandated

several changes in the text of the Aircraft Noise Abatement Act of 1968 (see
note 4 supra). The FAA attempted several rulemakings on jet noise created by
the older jet fleet including, ones on November 4, 1970, January 30, 1973, and
March 22, 1974. See note 16 supra at 1-2.
20

See note 16 supra at 1-3.
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the lowest profits of any sector of American industry." In 1975,

at the height of the congressional debate over whether to bypass
FAA rulemaking authority and simply legislate noise standards for
older jet aircraft, six of the twelve largest airlines showed sub-

stantial operating deficits." During the years 1974 through 1976,
many banks refused to lend to air carriers."
In order for the industry to update the present fleet of older
aircraft so as to comply with FAR Part 36, a minimum of approximately one billion dollars must be spent on aircraft engine modifi-

cations.' There are three technically feasible methods of modification which would result in reduction of noise levels sufficient to
allow an older jet aircraft to comply with FAR part 36.
The most inexpensive modification is a SAM retrofit of the aircraft's engines." SAM retrofit involves installation of sound absorbant materials in the interior nacelle' surfaces of the jet engine.

Such a retrofit would be required on virtually all of the smaller
jet transports in domestic service, including the Boeing 707, 727,
737 and the McDonnell Douglas DC-8 and DC-9 aircraft, with

the exception of a very few of such aircraft which were produced
after December 31, 1974." The entire cost to the air transport
industry of SAM retrofitting the noncomplying fleet is estimated at

approximately one billion dollars."
"For an enumeration of the twelve largest domestic airlines see note 90
infra. American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Eastern Airlines, Pan American
Airlines, Trans World Airlines, and United Airlines had deficits. See note 22
infra.
" See Moody's Investor's Service Inc., 10 Year Railroadand Airline Operating
Data, Friday, May 20, 1977, at 7-8.
2 Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys, January 1977, vol. I, at A64.
2 I1d. at A83.
" Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement before the Subcomm. on Aviation
and Transportation R. & D. of the House Comm. on Science and Technology,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-26 (1975) (testimony of David Sheftel) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement, 1975].
26 A "nacelle" is the outer covering of the turbojet engine.
" The FAA estimates that approximately 1600 aircraft out of a total domestic
fleet of 2100 aircraft would be noncomplying as of the date of the January 1,
1977, FAR Part 36 Amendment. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,046 (1977). Of the approximately 500 complying aircraft, 302 would be jumbo jets (LI011, DC-10, and
747), which, except for 100 747s, comply with the January 1, 1977 limits. Thus,
approximately 83% of the smaller (non-jumbo jet) jet transports would require
modification to meet FAR part 36.
2 See note 25 supra at 26.
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A second alternative, refan retrofit, results in a much lower level

of noise emissions than a SAM retrofit. Refan retrofit involves replacement of the old engines of older jet aircraft with new engines.
The new engine is a modified or rebuilt version of the old engine,

differing from the old engine primarily in that the new engine is
equipped with a different turbojet fan." The new engine differs
little in performance from the older engine, except that noise and

pollutant emissions are lower than those emitted by the older
engines. Measurements of noise levels of refan retrofitted aircraft
have shown noise reductions twelve to five hundred twenty-five percent greater than SAM retrofitted aircraft, differences depending

on which type of aircraft measurements are taken and at what
location they are taken."'

Technologically, refan retrofit is feasible for most of the older
jet aircraft." Despite the much greater reductions in jet noise to
be obtained by refan retrofitting, however, excessive costs prevent it from being a viable alternative. " The most recent estimate
for the cost of refan retrofitting the adaptable aircraft and SAM

retrofitting the remainder of the older jet fleet is approximately
five billion dollars." This figure is about seventy percent of the
estimated value of all flight equipment owned by U.S. airlines as
of January 1, 1974."

2Turbofan is defined in Dictionary of Technical Terms for Aerospace Use,
NASA (1965) as a "turbojet engine in which additional propulsive thrust is gained
by extending a portion of the compressor or turbine blades outside the inner engine case."

"These percentages are calculated from data on noise reductions achieved by
different methods of turbojet modification published in Hearings on Aircraft
Noise Abatement, 1975, supra note 25, at 27.
-1 Currently there is one refan engine available for retrofitting on older aircraft, the JT8D-209 refan. See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., September 12, 1977,
at 26-29. This engine is a variant of the JT8D-109 refan which was intended to be
a replacement for the JT8D, the stock powerplants for the Boeing 737 and 727
and the McDonnell Douglas DC-9. Present plans, however, do not provide for
installation of the JT8D-209 refan on such aircraft. There are now plans to
retrofit the JT8D-209 refan on the DC-8 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. May 16,
1977, at 22-23. Apparently the only aircraft for which the JT8D-209 refan would
not be available is the Boeing 707.
"It would cost approximately 7 million dollars to refan retrofit a DC-8. Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 16, 1977, at 22-23.
"3See Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement 1975, supra note 25, at 26. This
figure does not include the cost of refan retrofitting, rather than SAM retrofitting,
the DC-8. See note 31 supra.
"This figure is arrived at by dividing the 5 billion dollar estimated cost of
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A third possible method of altering the older jet aircraft so as
to comply with FAR Part 36 is to replace the entire engine with
a quieter engine of totally new design. Presently, only one such
engine is available to be retrofitted on older jet aircraft, the CFM
56. This engine presently can be retrofitted only on the DC-8,
although there has been some serious consideration of retrofitting
the 707 with the CFM 56." The total number of 707's and DC-8's
combined represented only twenty-four percent of the aircraft in
the domestic commercial jet fleet as of 1976.' The CFM 56,
in addition to being considerably quieter than comparable SAM
retrofitted engines, consumes approximately fifteen to twenty-one
percent less fuel than its present counterparts in service."
The primary obstacle to engine replacement (CFM 56) as an
alternative to SAM retrofit is again the prohibitive cost. The estimated cost of retrofitting new CFM 56 engines on a DC-8 is approximately ten to eleven million dollars per aircraft. This cost
is in most cases greater than the original purchase price of a DC-8. 8
According to Jack Hope of General Electric Co., the additional
benefits of the CFM 56, greater noise reduction and fuel efficiency,
may not justify the additional expenditures at the present time."
An alternative way to comply with the January 1, 1977, regulation is to replace the older jet aircraft with new aircraft which
comply with the regulations. This possibility, although obviously
the most costly of the alternatives, is being considered for several
reasons. First, many of the aircraft which do not comply with the
January 1, 1977, amendment have been in service for a very long
time. There is concern over such factors as the aircrafts' safety
and whether such aircraft might soon become obsolete."0 Replacerefan retrofitting the JT8D powered aircraft, and SAM retrofitting the remaining
aircraft, (see note 33 Id.) by the estimated net value of all flight equipment in
service in the United States as of 1975.
'See Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement, 1975, supra note 25, at 98-99,
and see Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 16, 1977, at 22-23.
" Hearings on H.R. 14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 8-9.
3 Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement Technology, Report prepared by
the Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation R&D of the Committee on
Science and Technology, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Noise Technology, 1976].
" Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement, 1975, supra note 25, at 144.
'Id.
at 98-100.
4
0 This concern is illustrated by the line of questioning in Hearings on Aircraft
Noise Abatement, 1975, Id. at 147-48.
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ment of these aircraft would alleviate this, as well as any concern
as to whether money should be invested in retrofitting or reengining such aging aircraft. "
Use of these new aircraft equipped with the new engines may
result in greater noise reductions than use of SAM retrofit methods.
The CFM 56 engine also offers significant fuel savings." There is
also a cost advantage; one reason replacing the engines of older
jet aircraft is so costly is that structural modifications must be
made to the old aircraft itself." Such expense is obviously not incurred when a new aircraft with new engines is purchased. There
is, however, uncertainty as to when new aircraft using engines
such as the JTD 209 refan or the CFM 56 might enter production.
Several such aircraft are presently at the design stage;" the primary obstacle to their introduction is a lack of sufficient firm orders
from airlines to make production economically feasible."
Even after adoption of a final rule requiring application of FAR
part 36 to the older jet aircraft, the financial questions which were
responsible for the FAA's delay in requiring this compliance by
older jet aircraft have not been resolved. These include what form
of federal assistance, if any, should be given to the industry to
enable it to meet the financial burden imposed on it by the January 1, 1977, FAR Part 36 amendment, and what would be the
financial effect on the air transport industry of the regulation in
the absence of any federal assistance.
I. MINETA PROPOSAL
At the present time there are four proposed alternative plans for
financing the expenditures which will be necessary for the present
commercial fleet to meet the new noise limits. The first proposal
was a plan formulated by Congressman Norman Mineta of California. Mineta's bill," introduced before the promulgation of the
January 1, 1977, amendment, would earmark three hundred mil41

But see text accompanying notes 110-17 infra.

Hearings on Noise Technology, 1976, note 37 supra, at 21.
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 16, 1977, at 22-23.
4Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., January 10, 1977, at 22-23.
Hearings on H.R. 14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 12, and Av.
4See
SPACE TECH., March 27, 1978, at 14.
- H.R. 14027, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
2See

,4'See

WEEK

&
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lion dollars annually of revenue from the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund" for the fiscal years 1977 through 1980 for grants to enable
aircraft operators to make the modifications necessary to meet FAR
Part 36 noise limits. Under the proposed legislation, the operator
of an aircraft not complying with FAR Part 36 regulations would
be entitled to a grant of the reasonable cost of a SAM retrofit.'
The older jet aircraft, if retrofitted, would be required to meet the
FAR Part 36 noise limits. The operator could, at his option, replace the noncomplying aircraft with a new aircraft complying
with FAR Part 36, the same grant of money also being available
to be applied to the purchase price of the new aircraft. The bill
provides no engine replacement option."
The Airport and Airway Trust fund was set up to provide for
the expansion and improvement of the nation's airport and airway
system." Mineta, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
stated that as of October 1, 1976, the trust fund had generated a
surplus of 1.334 billion dollars and was expected to generate an
additional surplus of 777 million dollars over the next four years.'
As the revenues of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund are generated by extraordinary taxes on air ticket and waybill fares, it
would seem equitable to return any surplus generated by such
taxes to the industry.

7See Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. S 1714
(1970).
48 H.R. 14027 provides that an operator must set forth "the price of purchasing the retrofit materials and the price of installing such materials" in his application for a grant. The FAA administrator approves the grant within sixty days
(approval is conditioned on whether the administrator believes that the aircraft

so modified will comply with the noise regulations and that the costs as set forth
are reasonable). See H.R. 14027, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. S 5 (1976).
4' The bill makes no requirement that the aircraft be an aircraft currently in
production, or one of the new design, only that it meet the applicable FAR part
36 noise limits. Id. § 6(a)(3).

"The absence of a replacement option is probably due to doubt as to the
viability of such an alternative, because of its prohibitive cost. See Hearings on
Aircraft Noise Abatement, 1975, supra note 25, at 98-99.

"H.R.

Rep. No. 91-601, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
3047.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEws

"Hearings on H.R. 14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 11.
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I.

WYDLER PROPOSAL

The second proposal," introduced by Representative Wydler of
New York on February 22, 1977, was drawn up by former Transportation Secretary William Coleman, Jr. This plan would allow
total appropriations of up to three hundred million dollars of Airport and Airway Trust funds to finance "modifications"' ' of aircraft not complying with FAR Part 36. This bill, in addition, provides that if an operator preferred to replace his aircraft, rather
than retrofit, the operator could petition the CAB for up to a
two percent noise abatement surcharge on air fare and freight
waybills.' The CAB would be required to establish such a surcharge and formulate a plan for disbursement of the funds generated by the surcharge within one year of the date of the petition.
This surcharge could be collected for up to ten years, the collected
revenues being placed in a new trust fund for replacement of
aircraft."' The owner of an, aircraft not complying with FAR Part
36 would be eligible for a grant out of the new trust of up to onethird of the purchase price of a new aircraft. The only conditions
attached to the grant would be that: (1) the replacement aircraft
must comply with FAR Part 36, and (2) an operator may buy
planes of no larger aggregate seating capacity than the aircraft
replaced."
The Wydler bill places a much greater emphasis on incentives
for replacing older aircraft than the Mineta bill. Appropriations
would, however, be correspondingly higher under the Wydler plan.
Mineta's bill would have placed a ceiling of 1.2 billion dollars on
expenditures over a four year period. The Wydler bill has no
statutory ceiling, but Secretary Coleman estimated that approximately 3.3 billion dollars would be granted under the plan.'
58H.R. 3802, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
5"The Wydler bill is unclear in many respects. It does not specify a method
of retrofitting, but rather, allows grants for "modifications" to meet the noise
regulations. Id. § 4.
OThe size of the surcharge would be determined "taking into account the
amount of expense to be incurred by each such person in the replacement or
modification of airplanes for the purpose of reducing aircraft noise." Id. at S 2.
"The bill, as does Mineta's bill, makes no requirement that the aircraft replaced be an aircraft currently in production, or one of new design. It must only
meet the applicable FAR part 36 noise limits. Id.
'

Id.

"See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., January 24, 1977, at 30.
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Either proposal might be financed using the budget surplus of
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, as the trust fund is expected
to have a surplus of 2.11 billion dollars by 1980." The Wydler
bill provides for a 1987 expiration date for the surcharge, by which
time the surplus should exceed 3 billion dollars. Due to the present
size of the trust fund surplus, there would seem to be a serious
question as to the necessity of legislating an additional surcharge,
as proposed under the Wydler bill.
III.

ANDERSON PROPOSALS

A. H.R. 4539
The third and fourth alternative plans for financing aircraft
noise abatement have been formulated by the chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Public Works and Transportation, Representative Glen Anderson of California. The two Anderson bills,
although having some similarities, differ significantly enough from
each other as to warrant separate discussion of each.
The first Anderson bill, H.R. 4539,"' was introduced and referred
to the House Subcommittee on Public Works and Transportation.
H.R. 4539 provides for the imposition of an industry-wide two percent surcharge on the price of a passenger ticket and cargo waybill.
The revenues of this surcharge would be collected and held by the
individual airline operators. Once the revenues of the surcharge
collected by the operator equalled the respective allocationse' available to him under the bill, the additional revenues collected would
be turned over to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. Should the
carrier not be able to collect sufficient revenue to meet his allocation under the plan, funds from the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund would be made available to him in order to make up the
difference. The surcharge would expire when all carriers had col" Hearings on

H.R. 14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 11.

11H.R. 4539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
"IId. Title III § 303(b)(5). The bill would require the FAA Administrator
to publish within 60 days of enactment of the bill, a list of all noncomplying
aircraft in the U.S. Within 30 additional days, the owners of these noncomplying
aircraft must determine which of the three available methods of compliance will
be used. Following this 30-day period, the administrator must within 30 more
days publish a list of the cost of retrofitting each aircraft. Therefore, within 120
days of the enactment of the bill the amount of money a carrier may receive
under the provisions of the bill is set. Id. Title III, S 302.
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lected their allocation under the bill or within ten years of the
passage of the bill.
The funds collected would be available to the operator of an
aircraft not meeting FAR Part 36 to finance seventy-five percent
of the cost of a SAM retrofit. The bill would allow a grant of one
and one-half times what it would cost to SAM retrofit an aircraft
to finance engine replacement for the same aircraft. A grant of
two and one-half times what it would have cost to retrofit the old
noncomplying aircraft would be available to replace the old aircraft."
As with the Wydler bill the obvious objective of this proposal
is to encourage fleet replacement over alternative retrofit modification. H.R. 4539, however, would not provide as liberal a replacement incentive as the Wydler program. For example, the
available grant under H.R. 4539 to replace a DC-9 would be
approximately $350,000, representing 250 percent of the cost of
retrofitting the DC-9.u The DC-9 would have an estimated purchase price of three and one-half to ten million dollars." The
Wydler plan, allowing grants of up to one-third the purchase
price of the new aircraft, provides a much greater incentive for
replacement than H.R. 4539.
H.R. 4539 has a hidden incentive for replacement in that it
proposes an industry-wide two percent surcharge. The Wydler surcharge is a tax for which an operator voluntarily petitions the CAB.
By petitioning for a surcharge under the Wydler proposal, a carrier
would be putting itself at a competitive disadvantage if other carriers did not likewise petition for a surcharge. Thus, H.R. 4539
by requiring the surcharge for all operators, allows a carrier to
participate in the replacement incentive program without sacrificing his competitive position.
02 As with the Mineta and Wydler bills, this bill does not require that any advanced aircraft be purchased. It only requires that the replacement aircraft meet
the applicable FAR part 36 limits. Thus, apparently either new aircraft presently
in production or aircraft of new design could be purchased.

" The figure given is calculated by multiplying the estimated cost of retrofitting a DC-9 by 2.5 (250%)-Hearings on Noise Technology, 1976, supra note
37, at 21.
"Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement, 1975, supra note 25, at 144 (testimony of A. L. McPike).
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B. H.R. 8124
The fourth alternative, and the second proposal submitted by
Representative Anderson, H.R. 81 2 4 ," was introduced to the
House of Representatives and referred to the House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation on June 30, 1977. H.R. 8124
is a much more comprehensive plan than any of its counterparts.
H.R. 8124 requires, as does H.R. 4539, a two percent surcharge
on airline fares and cargo waybills." This surcharge would be used
to finance significantly larger grants for engine or aircraft replacement than that provided for in H.R. 4539. In addition to providing
much larger grants, the surcharge would be mandatorily effective
for only five years under H.R. 8124, as opposed to the ten year
period provided for in H.R. 4539. Under H.R. 8124, however,
following the expiration of the five year period of mandatory imposition of the surcharge, an individual carrier could, by notifying
the Secretary of the Treasury, collect the same revenues for up to
five additional years.
Like H.R. 4539, H.R. 8124 would provide that the revenues
collected under the plan be deposited by an aircraft operator in a
separate bank account for purpose of aircraft retrofit or replacement. Funds collected by an operator having no noncomplying
aircraft, and funds collected by an operator in excess of the
amount of the grants statutorily available under the plan, would
be turned over periodically to the Airway Trust Fund.
H.R. 8124 would allow an aircraft operator the option of SAM
retrofitting, replacing the engines, or replacing the noncomplying
aircraft. Unlike H.R. 4539, however, H.R. 8124 differs in that
the size of the grant available for SAM retrofit would be dependent on the type of aircraft which is to be retrofitted. The size of
the grant available for the purchasing of replacement aircraft
would depend on the noise level of the aircraft purchased.
H.R. 8124 would allow an operator of a noncomplying aircraft
a grant of fifty percent of the cost of the SAM retrofit to an operator who wishes to SAM retrofit an aircraft having fewer than
"H.R.

8124, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Only Title III of H.R. 8124 deals

with aircraft noise abatement financing. Titles I and II provide federal assistance
for local airports to establish a comprehensive program for the systematic reduction of noncompatible land uses in areas surrounding certain airports.
"The

bill imposes a three dollar head tax instead of a two dollar fare sur-

charge on international flights.
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four engines. The apparent rationale for providing smaller grants
for retrofitting four-engine aircraft is that the majority of the
four-engine aircraft which need modification, primarily the Boeing
707 and McDonnell Douglas DC-8, are much noisier than their
two and three-engine counterparts."7 These four-engine aircraft also
tend to be much older than the two and three-engine aircraft in
service. The combination of age and inherently higher noise emissions of the four-engine aircraft make it desirable to provide relatively less incentive for their upkeep and relatively more incentive
to replace these four-engine aircraft with newer FAR Part 36 complying aircraft.
H.R. 8124 also would allow an operator the option of replacing the aircraft's engines as an alternative to SAM retrofit or
aircraft replacement. H.R. 8124 would provide a grant of seventyfive percent of the actual cost of replacing the engines, 8 with the
limitation that the cost of replacing the old engines may not exceed thirty-five percent of the cost of replacing the entire aircraft.
An aircraft operator choosing to replace a noncomplying aircraft has two options under H.R. 8124: he can purchase a new
aircraft which meets the January, 1977 FAR Part 36 noise limitations and receive a grant of twenty percent of the purchase price
of the new aircraft, or he may purchase an aircraft which meets
the noise limits set down for new type aircraft by the March 3,
1977, FAR Part 36 amendments " and receive a grant of thirty-five
percent of the purchase price of the new aircraft. Aircraft currently on production would qualify only for the smaller grant, as
they do not meet the stricter March 1977 noise limits.
A further provision of H.R. 8124 extends the deadline for compliance with the January 1, 1977 FAR Part 36 amendment for
two engine aircraft and the Boeing 727-200 to January 1, 1990.
"7Hearings on

H.R. 14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 8.
The JT3 and JT8D are the stock engines for the Boeing 737 and 727, and
McDonnell Douglas DC-8 and DC-9. The present replacement cost of the JT3D
is approximately $600,000, and the cost of the JT8D is about $900,000. H.R.
68

8124 obviously provides larger incentives than does H.R. 4539 for engine replacement. As an example: H.R. 4539 would allow approximately $225,000 for
engine replacement for a Boeing 727 (1.5 (150%)) x $152,000 (price of SAM
retrofit)). H.R. 8124 would provide approximately $2,025,000 for engine replace-

ment of the same aircraft (3 (number of engines) x .75(75%)
(the cost of the JT8D which powers the 727)).
.See note 15 supra.

X $900,000
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If an operator decides to take advantage of this extension, the
grants available are reduced to (1) fifty percent of the cost of retrofit, (2) twenty-five percent of the cost of engine replacement, and
(3) ten percent of the cost of any replacement aircraft. Receipt of
the grants are dependent upon the operator meeting several further conditions. First, in the event that an aircraft is replaced, the
bill provides that fifty percent of its price must result from work
by United States manufacturers. A second condition of H.R. 8124
regarding replacement aircraft, also imposed by the Wydler bill,
is that the new aircraft must have essentially the same seating and
cargo capacity as the aircraft replaced. Plans as to seating capacity
for aircraft of new design have not yet been solidified, so it is not
yet certain that new aircraft designs would qualify for a grant
under either bill."0
In addition, there would be restrictions on transferring new
aircraft and on the aircraft for which new engines are purchased.
An operator could not sell a replacement aircraft for fifteen years
following its acquisition. An aircraft which has been re-engined
could not be sold for five years.' The statute, however, apparently
places no limitation on an operator leasing either type of aircraft.
This omission would frustrate the purpose manifested by the prohibition of aircraft sales, that of preventing a carrier from realizing
a gain by selling or leasing an aircraft for which a grant had been
given to purchase.
An important difference between H.R. 8124 and the other Congressional noise abatement financing proposals is that H.R. 8124
is the only bill which would provide incentives for the airlines to
purchase aircraft quieter than the FAR part 36 complying aircraft
currently being produced."2 A potential result of this incentive to
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., January 10, 1977, at 22-23.
H.R. 8124, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304(b)(1) (1977).
72 There is, however, doubt as to the significance of these reduced limits. The
FAR part 36 March, 1977, amendment, see note 15 supra, requires noise reduction
of approximately "I to 6 EPNdB for four engine aircraft, 3 to 8 EPNdB for three
engine types, and 3 to 9 EPNdB for two engine types"; see 42 Fed. Reg. 12,363
(1977). "EPNdB" stands for effective perceived noise level. This unit is the unit
used for measurement of aircraft noise, and is a relative standard. See 14 C.F.R.
S 36 app. A (1977) for the method of actual derivation or calculation of aircraft
noise using this unit. Mr. A. L. McPike, of McDonnell Douglas Corporation, in
testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology (see Hearings
on Aircraft Noise Abatement, 1975, supra note 25, at 146), when asked by Rep.
Wydler if a 6-8 EPNdB noise reduction would be noticeable on the ground re70See
71
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purchase quieter aircraft is that it may encourage development of
a new generation of commercial turbojet aircraft. Several new
commercial jet transports are presently in the planning stage."'
The primary obstacle to their ultimate production is the reluctance
of the major airlines to commit themselves to purchase sufficient
numbers of such aircraft necessary to make their production
profitable." The proposed transports will probably incorporate
high bypass ratio technology engines,"' similar to those necessary
to obtain the reduced noise emissions, which would qualify an
aircraft for a thirty-five percent grant under H.R. 8124. Thus,
H.R. 8124 might very well provide sufficient incentive to purchase
such new aircraft to make their introduction economically feasible.
H.R. 8124 seems to provide the largest actual incentive of all
the present noise abatement financing proposals for replacing
noncomplying aircraft with new jet transports."' The grant of
twenty percent of the purchase price of a new aircraft is not, in
absolute terms, as large as the thirty-three and one-third percent
grant available under the Wydler plan; however, a carrier would
be much more likely to take advantage of Anderson's twenty percent grant. A carrier is more likely to receive a grant under Anderson's proposal because the grants under Anderson's proposal are
generated by a surcharge which is mandatorily imposed upon all
carriers regardless of whether one chooses to make use of the
grants available." The Wydler bill, in contrast, provides for funding of grants by a tax which a carrier voluntarily imposes upon
himself. The carrier, therefore, by accepting a grant under Anderson's H.R. 8124 would not put himself at a competitive disadvansponded: "six to eight is borderline where I think it would be noticeable." Ap-

parently the noise reduction which would qualify an operator for an increased
replacement grant under H.R. 8124 is not very significant. It is questionable in

view of the high cost of achieving such further noise reductions whether such
should be so greatly encouraged.
' 3 Av. WEEK & SPACE TEcH., January 10, 1977, at 23.
,4See note 45 supra.
"See note 73 supra, and see Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., January 31, 1977 at

25.
,7Similarly, H.R. 8124, unquestionably provides the largest incentive for en-

gine replacement, the only engine replacement incentive available under alternative proposals being the grant of 150% of the cost of a retrofit available under
Anderson's first bill, H.R. 4539.

" H.R. 8124, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1977).
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tage as he might by accepting a grant under the Wydler proposal."
The delay in the formulation of a final financing package has
resulted from several circumstances. Perhaps the biggest obstacle
to formulation of a final plan has been the personal disagreement
of the two most prominent members of the Public Works and
Transportation Subcommittee: Representatives Glenn Anderson
and Gene Snyder."9 The extent of the differences between these two
men's positions can be readily determined by contrasting the respective bills they have sponsored concerning the subject matter.
Anderson has submitted the two proposals already discussed in
detail above, while Snyder, in March, 1977, proposed simply to
exempt the noncomplying aircraft built before 1974 from compliance with FAR Part 36. ° The Snyder proposal is one which has
generated little support and is probably not a realistic alternative

" This deleterious effect is minimized in a third Anderson bill, H.R. 8729,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This bill is very close in substance to H.R. 8124,
being essentially a rewrite of H.R. 8124. It does have one important difference
which, as stated above, minimizes the disruption of the relative competitive position of the individual airlines. This provision redefines "cost" of the replacement
aircraft as follows:
For the purpose of subparagraph (C) [replacement grant provision]
of paragraph (2) of this subsection the cost of a replacement aircraft shall be the actual cost reduced by the aggregate amount allowable under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for depreciation
or amortization with respect to the aircraft being replaced, for
periods before the date of acquisition of the replacement aircraft.
Id. § 303(b)(3).
The apparent result of this provision is to provide a carrier operating an older
aircraft with less federal assistance than an operator of a newer aircraft, as the
owner of the older aircraft would have already taken a substantial amount, if
not all, of the depreciation allowable on the older craft. Thus, "cost" of the new
replacement aircraft, as defined in H.R. 8729, would be much smaller for the
replacement aircraft and the operator of the older craft would get a smaller
grant.
This above provision makes the entire scheme far less disturbing to the economic competitive equilibrium than H.R. 8124 would be. This cost provision is
commendable in that it eliminates the windfall to those carriers with large numbers of older aircraft.
A second change in H.R. 8729 is that it increases the tax surcharges levied
on foreign flights. It changes the $3 head tax, see note 66 supra, to a $2 head tax
on flights costing less than $100 and to a $10 head tax on flights costing over
$100. Id. § 303(a)(2). The bill changes the 2% surcharge on foreign freight
waybills to a 5% tax. Id. S 303(a)(4).
The only other significant change allows the FAA administrator to waive
temporarily, for a reasonable time, compliance with FAR part 36 if the Administrator finds good cause. Id. § 306.
"See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., April 25, 1977, at 53.
8
H.R. 5706, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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in view of the overwhelming support of the various congressional
bills enacted which provided the FAA with authority to regulate
aircraft noise and which later encouraged the FAA to use this
authority to extend regulation to the older fleet. It would also
seem that public awareness and sentiment for noise control has
reached a high level in recent months; this is clearly evident in
the controversy over the granting of landing rights for the Concord SST.81
A further impediment to enactment of a noise abatement financing bill may be the efforts by various Congressmen to tie noise
abatement financing to some form of deregulation reform." These
diverse viewpoints among the members of the Public Works and
Transportation Subcommittee make it very uncertain what type of
bill will emerge from the committee. These differences suggest that
careful consideration be given to the economic feasibility of requiring the airline industry alone to finance the fleet modifications
necessary to comply with the FAR Part 36 limitations, and this
requires an inquiry into the financial capacity of the industry to
comply with the noise regulations.
The financial status of the industry' would seem to indicate that
there is not sufficient capital available within the industry to cover
the cost of even the least expensive modifications, SAM retrofitting, of the present fleet. Thus, it is argued that obtaining the
significantly larger finances necessary for aircraft replacement, engine replacement, or refan retrofitting, would appear to be totally
beyond the economic capabilities of the industry." There are important factors, however, which indicate that substantial amounts
of capital may be available to the airlines and that some type of
modification is within their means. The overall airline industry
financial picture improved considerably in 1976, as profits rose
steadily due to significant increase in air travel.' Only one of the

"' See

Newsweek, May 23, 1977, at 20; see also Donin, British Airways v.

Port Authority: Its Impact on Aircraft Noise Regulation, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 691
(1977); see also Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., March 14, 1977, at 9.
"See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., April 18, 1977, at 31.
83See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
"Estimates of the cost of all the various alternatives are not available. Secretary Coleman did estimate that the cost of Wydler's proposal would be approxi-

mately 3.3 billion dollars. See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., January 24, 1977, at 30.
1 See Standard & Poors Industry Surveys 1977, July, Vol. I, at A63.
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twelve major airlines recorded a deficit in 1976, compared to six
in 1975." Several of the larger airlines which had performed poorly
in the past should show greatly increased profits for 1976." In
1977, record industry profits are anticipated."

In addition to improved profits in 1976, there have been substantial numbers of new aircraft ordered by the major airlines,

representing a certain amount of net capital investment. 8 The Wall
Street Journal recorded from March, 1976, to March, 1977, orders
by the twelve major airlines:0 of one hundred fourteen new aircraft,
including one hundred and four Boeing 727s, three McDonnell
Douglas DC-10s, two Lockheed L-1011s" and one Boeing 747.
These purchases represent expenditures of over one billion dollars."
"See note 22 supra.
87 American realized an operating profit of 71.8 million dollars in 1976, compared to a loss of 19.7 million dollars in 1975. Trans World Airlines realized a
profit of 103.1 million dollars in 1976, compared to a loss of 45.0 million dollars
in 1975. United Airlines realized a profit of 59.3 million dollars in 1976, compared
to a profit of 22.4 million dollars in 1975. See note 22 supra.
8 See note 85 supra.

"See note 91 infra.
" The twelve largest domestic airlines, by amount of revenue, include: American Airlines, Inc., Braniff International Corp., Continental Air Lines, Inc., Delta
Air Lines, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., National Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Pan American World Airways, Inc., TIGER International, Inc., Trans
World Airlines, Inc., UAL, Inc., and Western Air Lines, Inc.
" Aircraft purchases recorded from March 29, 1976, to March 31, 1977:
American Airlines purchases:
3 DC-10s, Wall Street Journal, January 20, 1977, at 36, col. 1. 16 727's, Wall
Street Journal, August 3, 1976, at 6, col. 2, and Wall Street Journal, September
16, 1976, at 18, col. 3.
Braniff purchases:
12 727's, Wall Street Journal, February 8, 1977, at 5, col. 2, and Wall Street
Journal, July 20, 1976, at 34, col. 4.
Eastern purchases:
6 727's, Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1976, at 26, col. 4.
Delta purchases:
2 L-101 l's, Wall Street Journal, August 4, 1976, at 9, col. 1. 37 727's, Wall Street
Journal, February 8, 1977, at 5, col. 2 and Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1976,
at 11, col. 3.
Northwest Airlines purchases:
9 727's, and one 747, Wall Street Journal, October 26, 1976, at 3, col. 4, and
Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1976, at 33, col. 4.
UAL purchases:
28 727's, Wall Street Journal, October 1, 1976, at 11, col. 3.
2 This figure is based upon a calculation of the summation of the products
of the number of specified aircraft purchased and the minimum price at which
such aircraft presently sell. Depending on the model purchased, a 727 sells for
about 10-15 million dollars, and a DC-10, 747, or L-1011 sells for a price in
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Twenty-five aircraft disposals were noted for the same period.
These planes, older DC-8s, DC-9s, and 737s, were sold to various
foreign and domestic carriers.' These aircraft purchases, although
representing additional financial obligations, are largely new additions to the commercial fleet rather than replacement aircraft.
Admittedly, some individual airlines, most notably Pan American
World Airways, have not recently been able to purchase any aircraft," but the fact that the industry can make new additions to
the stock of commercial aircraft would seem to indicate that the
industry as a whole is somewhat more viable than its recent profit
picture would indicate.
In addition to purchasing new aircraft during the past twelve
months, several of the more financially distressed airlines have
managed to acquire substantial sums of new capital. Pan American,
which had the worst profit record of the twelve major airlines over
the last ten years, substantially completed an offer to swap 341
million dollars in outstanding bonds for common stock in June
1976.' In preparing for the offer, Pan American had obtained
stockholder authorization to increase its number of shares of
common stock from 80 million to 110 million." Later, in September 1976, Pan American sold a 75 million dollar issuance of convertible bonds in one day." A further promising headline reported
that CAB, after extensive study, had decided that Pan American's
survival did not require a federal subsidy." Although the financial
viability of Pan Am is far from certain (these capital improvements
being relatively minor), these capital acquisitions by the weakest
airline help illustrate the general easing of the credit market and
excess of 30 million dollars. This calculation results in a minimum cost of the
114 aircraft, of approximately 1.26 billion dollars. (Calculations taken from sales
indicated in note 91, supra.)

0 The 25 aircraft were disposed of as follows:
19 DC-8 aircraft were sold by Delta to FBA Aircraft S.A. of Switzerland, Wall
Street Journal, May 11, 1976, at 11, col. 3.

4 DC-9 aircraft were sold by Delta to Ozark Airlines, Wall Street Journal, September 9, 1976, at 8, col. 4.
2 Boeing 737 aircraft were sold by UAL to Frontier Airlines, Wall Street Journal,
March 30, 1976, at 35, col. 5.
"See note 91 supra.
"Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1976, at 10, col. 5.

"Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1976, at 27, col. 3.
"'Wall Street Journal, September 29, 1976, at.38, col. 1.

"Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1976, at 8, col. 3.
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general industry-wide financial improvement which has taken place
in 1976 and has continued into 1977. Other major carriers have
experienced a similar improvement in obtaining capital."'
These acquisitions of new aircraft and new sources of capital
indicate that given present conditions the industry can make certain net investments. Obviously, in most cases acquisition of aircraft and new capital are not separate indicators of financial
strength, as new aircraft purchases require new capital. In addition,
new aircraft purchases would be reflected in increased future
profits, while investment in noise abatement would not increase
future revenues. A further consideration is that certain individual
airlines might not be able to bear the cost of even a SAM retrofit.
The fact that a large amount of net investment is being made
indicates, however, that the industry may be capable of financing
some type of noise abatement program such as a SAM retrofit.
Although a retrofit might be self-financed by the airlines', there
is a question as to whether the airlines should go one step further
and replace the older aircraft. Could the industry finance the replacement of a large percentage of the existing aircraft, and if
not, should federal assistance be provided?
Evidence that the airline industry can purchase sufficient aircraft
to meet its needs has been provided by a study conducted last year
by Edmund S. Greenslet of the New York investment firm of
Shields Model Roland.' ° The study, taking into consideration such
factors as recent lowerings of airline debt/equity ratios,' 1 anticipated further lowering of airline debt, improved profits in 1976
and further improvements anticipated for the foreseeable future,
and favorable changes in federal income tax law, found that the
investment capacity of the industry was more than sufficient to

so Eastern Airlines, eleventh out of the twelve major airlines in profitability,
obtained a possible 50 million dollars in financing in August of 1976, opening the
way for the purchase of six 727 aircraft. See Wall Street Journal, August 27,
1976, at 10, col. 1. American Airlines, ninth in profit performance, has been particularly successful both in obtaining substantial financing and in purchasing new
aircraft. In August and September of 1976, after turning down a 200 million
dollar line of credit because it exceeded the prime interest rate by .5% American
ordered 16 new Boeing 727s. Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1976, at 25, col. 1
and see note 91 supra. In March of 1977, American initiated an offering of five

million shares of preferred stock, which represented 125 million dollars in new
capital. Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1977, at 38, col. 3.
"00Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 11, 1977, at 26-29.
id. at 29.
i01
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meet future industry needs. The Greenslet study estimated that
the investment needs of the United States carriers will be approximately $69.4 billion through 1990, while the investment capacity
of the entire industry will be $82 billion dollars for the same time
period.
The Greenslet study did find that several individual carriers will
have difficulty in generating sufficient capital for aircraft replacement. In explaining why several of the airlines had very insufficient
investment capacity, while the majority of the airlines have excess
capacity, as does the industry as a whole, Greenslet concluded that
those with insufficient capital had heavily overinvested in the past;
they were spending far more for capital equipment than the earning power of the airline warranted.
The Greenslet study raises several questions for Congress to
consider when formulating an aircraft noise abatement financing
scheme. The first question is whether federal assistance is necessary
or desirable. The Greenslet study found that seven of the eleven
major airlines have the capacity to invest well above their present
needs. In contrast, the other four airlines, including three of the
four largest, do not have a sufficient capacity. The study found
that the airlines with insufficient investment capacity were those
which had had faulty asset and investment management in the
past. These airlines also tended to be the airlines with the largest
percentage of older noncomplying aircraft in their fleet. It is these
airlines, with insufficient investment capacity, that the noise abatement financing bills will primarily benefit.
Concern over the economic viability of the airline industry
seems to be the overriding factor motivating the enactment of a
noise abatement financing bill. The various congressional bills,
with the exception of the Wydler bill, all allow grants based on an
airline's need to modify or replace aircraft. The bills provide
assistance through use of an industry-wide tax increase, or as in
the Mineta plan, through use of surplus tax revenues from the
Airway Trust Fund. The Greenslet study implies that such proposals in effect will reward those carriers who have made past
management errors proportionately more than those carriers who
through efficient management have maintained a quieter, more
modem fleet of aircraft. Thus, a serious question arises as to
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whether allocating benefits in such a manner furthers the goal of
making the industry more economically viable.
The magnitude of this reverse compensation effect of the proposed bills varies with the individual proposal. The Mineta plan,
although benefiting the inefficient carrier more, will produce an
overall bentfit to the industry, as it requires no tax increase to
finance the grants which might discourage airline utilization. In
addition, the maximum grants available under the bill's provisions
are small when compared to the grants available under the other
bills; they range from 140,000 dollars to 800,000 dollars per aircraft.1'" The Anderson bills provide for much larger maximum
grants. H.R. 4539 would provide two and a half times the size of
the grant available under Mineta's proposal. H.R. 8124 provides
twenty percent of the purchase price of a new aircraft or approximately two to three million dollars per aircraft replaced." 3
A further question is whether, by providing large incentives for
replacement of aircraft, as provided in the Wydler and Anderson
bills, we are failing to take heed of the lessons to be learned from
the past ten years? In other words, are we encouraging airlines,
which are just emerging from financial difficulty, to repeat the same
mistake of over-investment? '" Grants under the Wydler bill and
Anderson's H.R. 8124, of twenty to thirty-five percent of replacement cost, amounting to several millions of dollars per plane,
are certainly very substantial replacement incentives. The size of
the proposed assistance is so great that it might encourage even
the more viable airlines to make uneconomic aircraft purchases.
Even though the airlines may be financially able to comply
with the January, 1977 FAR Part 36 noise regulations, and to
purchase sufficient aircraft to meet their foreseeable economic
needs, there may still be reason to provide a replacement incentive.
The technology exists to produce aircraft which are quieter and
more fuel efficient than the aircraft which are presently being purchased."0 There does not, however, appear to be a great deal of
102Hearings on Noise Technology, 1976, supra note 37, at 21.

MThis figure is based upon the present selling price range of a Boeing 727
(the only aircraft of non-jumbo-jet class currently being sold in quantity). See
note 92 supra.
1
04See note 100 supra.

1'42 Fed. Reg. 12,360 (1977) at 12,362-12,363.
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sentiment among the airlines for purchasing quieter and more fuel
efficient aircraft.'" One reason for this is that such aircraft will
be more expensive than aircraft presently available. There are
associated costs which must be borne when aircraft of new design
are purchased. Such costs include buying spare parts and training
crews and mechanics to accommodate new planes."' These costs
are avoided by buying current production models. Therefore, it
may be desirable to provide financial assistance to the airlines to
purchase the quieter and more fuel efficient aircraft to insure that
such aircraft are utilized. A replacement incentive may be critical
to the introduction of new aircraft such as the 7X7 or 7N7.'"
Another reason a replacement incentive might be appropriate
is that the airlines are not likely to give proper weight to a goal
such as reducing aircraft noise. While factors such as increased
fuel efficiency would be reflected in airline profits, aircraft noise is
not a factor which contributes to the profitability of an airline.
It should be noted, however, that there is a serious question as to
whether the available reductions in noise to be obtained by the
aircraft replacement would be worth the large cost.'"
Another consideration is that through use of new technology
such as the CFM 56 engine, reductions in fuel consumption of
fifteen percent to twenty-one percent have been achieved.' °
Although these reductions are significant, there are no firm plans to
use this engine on aircraft which are presently in production."'
Boeing is considering use of the CFM 56 on the 7N7."' Nowhere,
however, in the available literature has there been a determination
See Hearings on H.R. 14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 12.
100 supra at 29.
' The 7N7 and 7X7 are two Boeing aircraft presently in the planning stage.
The exact size, engines which will be utilized, and other specifications of these
aircraft, are not yet final. These aircraft are, however, considered likely to be the
next line of U.S.-produced aircraft to be introduced into commercial service.
See generally, Hearings on H.R. 14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 12, and Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., January 10, 1977, at 22-23.
10

107 See note

'"See note 92 supra.
1" Hearings on Noise Technology, 1976, supra note 37, at 21.
"' Several proposals have been made to utilize this engine on current production aircraft or as a retrofit engine. See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 16, 1977,
at 22-23, and Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., November 7, 1977, at 111. No carrier
has, however, decided to either order such new aircraft or retrofit an aircraft
under these plans.
"'See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., January 10, 1977, at 22-23.
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of just how significant such fuel savings would be, or whether such
fuel savings alone would justify introduction, of aircraft using new
engines.11
A final concern in the issue of whether to provide a replacement
incentive is whether safety should be an important factor or a
goal. The concern over safety is primarily with regard to the long
period of time many of the aircraft in the commercial jet fleet have
been in service."" Some aircraft, such as the DC-8, have been in
service since as early as 1959. "' There is evidence, however, that
this concern is not a viable reason for advocating substantial replacement of the present noncomplying aircraft. During testimony
before the Committee on Science & Technology, Mr. A. D. McPike,
of McDonnell Douglas, testified that his company had updated
the company's estimates of the life of a DC-8 aircraft to at least
80,000 hours, that no DC-8 had ever flown that long, and that
such a life expectancy might be extended in the future. ' The
figure of 80,000 hours represents 9.1 years of continuous flying.
The substance of the testimony was essentially that modem jet
transports have been built too well; as long as an airline properly
maintains an aircraft it can be operated safely for a very long
time.117

The gains which are advocated by use of aircraft of totally
new design are basically the same gains of fuel efficiency, noise
reduction, and safety which have been discussed above. Encouraging introduction of new aircraft such as the 7X7 or 7N7, however,
is probably the strongest motivating factor behind providing large
replacement incentives. Both members of Congress and the FAA
have expressed their opinion that such aircraft should be developed.1 8 The widespread concern over development of such aircraft seems to be motivated primarily by a concern for maintaining
United States leadership in production of aerospace manufactures.
1' Frank Borman, of Eastern Airlines, stated that he did not believe that the
fuel savings to be obtained by use of new aircraft designs would justify aircraft
replacement at the present time. Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1976, at 5,
col. 1.
114 See Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement, 1975, supra note 25, at 147-48.
1

See

NEWSWEEK,

September 14, 1959, at 99.

" See note 114 supra.
117 Id.
"' See notes 105 and 106 supra.
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This first goal is closely related to a second goal, that of maintaining United States capacity to produce sufficient military aircraft
to meet national defense requirements.1 '
No aircraft of new design, however, is expected to reach production until the Boeing 7N7 or 7X7 reaches production. The
tentative timetable for introduction of these aircraft is early 1982.
Boeing is presently uncertain which of the two proposed planes
will be produced or whether both will be produced, how many
engines each aircraft will have, and what engines will be used.
Any speculation that substantial numbers of these aircraft could
be purchased before January 1, 1985, FAR Part 36 deadline, or
that if such aircraft were introduced, they would be substantially
quieter or more fuel efficient than their present counterparts, is
purely conjectural.
In addition to the doubt as to the benefits which can actually
be obtained from aircraft replacement," 0 it should be noted that
the bills providing large replacement incentives are not structured
to require that the aircraft purchased further the goals of obtaining
quieter, more fuel efficient, safe aircraft, and aircraft of new
design. The new aircraft that airlines are presently purchasing
differ from the older noncomplying aircraft primarily in that the
engines of the new aircraft are manufactured incorporating the
same SAM technology which could be used to SAM retrofit older
aircraft."" In other words, these aircraft are no more fuel efficient,
safe, or quiet than would be older planes which had been SAM
retrofitted.
It should also be noted that there is no requirement under the
provisions of most of the bills for the airlines to modify their present buying pattern. Only Representative Anderson's last two bills,
H.R. 81241" and its later version, H.R. 8729,1 would give an
"'See The Future of Aviation: Report prepared by the Subcomm. on Aviation
and Transportation R & D of the House Comm. on Science and Technology,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. I, at 1-10 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Future of Aviation, 1976).
12 For divergent discussions of whether new aircraft are necessary see Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., October 25, 1976, at 31, Wall Street Journal, October 22,
1976, at 1, cot. 6, and Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
1' See Hearings on Aircraft Noise Abatement, 1975, supra note 25, at 146-47.
' See note 65 supra.
13

2

See note 78 supra.
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operator a larger replacement grant if aircraft meeting the March
FAR part 36 noise limits were purchased.1" Although the bills
provide large incentives to purchase quieter aircraft it is not certain
that the incentives will be sufficient to cause the airlines to purchase
aircraft meeting the stricter March, 1977 noise limits, rather than
aircraft meeting only the January, 1977 noise limits.
Should the airlines, under the bills, purchase present production
aircraft the net result of the aircraft replacement would be that
new aircraft would be acquired. Such a program of aircraft replacement might well be beneficial to the airlines. The same argument, however, applies equally to most other sectors of American
industry. The net result of aircraft replacement would be that the
airlines had been assisted in acquiring new capital assets. Why
shouldn't the same reasoning require the government to invest in
railroads, or modernize steel mills?
The primary driving force behind introduction of new aircraft
is probably political in nature. Recent aerospace industry setbacks
such as cancellation of the B1 bomber and reductions in production schedules of other military hardware, along with competition
from various new foreign commercial aircraft, have created concern for the future of the United 'States aerospace industry. As
mentioned, introduction of such new commercial aircraft is seen
as a means of insuring continued United States predominance in
production of aerospace manfactures.1" It should be noted, however, that this concern is not a concern specifically with the welfare of the airline industry, but more properly a concern with the
welfare of the aerospace industry. The existence of these considerations helps explain the widespread support for aircraft replacement despite the uncertain benefits which may be available
under the present proposals.
In summary, there is doubt as to the benefits to be derived from
aircraft replacement and also as to whether the Wydler and Anderson bills are structured so as to insure that the available improvements in fuel efficiency are actually realized. In addition, the
replacement bills all require an effective increase in the price of
air travel. Although a large aircraft replacement incentive is probSee text accompanying note 69 supra.
Future of Aviation, 1976, supra note 119 at 1-10, and Hearings on
14027, 1976, supra note 16, at 12.
'

"See
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ably not desirable, financial assistance to SAM retrofit aircraft
may indeed be desirable. Although many of the airlines are financially solid, several are in difficulty. Conceivably, the added expense required to modify aircraft might be a death blow to certain carriers. There is a certain inequity in imposing noise abatement cost, at the present time, in view of the recent extraordinary
economic difficulties of the industry.
Likewise, it would seem that if financial aid is given to SAM
retrofit aircraft, then an operator should be given the option to
use whatever assistance is given to retrofit an aircraft or to replace the aircraft An operator should not be required to invest
money in an older aircraft which for economic reasons should
properly be replaced. The Mineta bill meets these twin goals of
providing grants to SAM retrofit an aircraft and allowing an operator the option of applying the same sum of money to replace the
aircraft.
The Mineta bill does not suffer from the major weaknesses of
the Anderson and Wydler proposals. The Mineta bill does not
provide a large incentive for replacement of older aircraft at a
time when it is not certain such replacement is needed. Further,
it does not, as do the other proposals before the House, result in
an increase in the effective cost of air travel. Appropriations under
the Mineta bill are derived from surplus revenues of a trust fund
designed to further commercial aviation. These industry-raised
revenues should properly be returned to the industry from which
they originate. The Mineta plan facilitates this return. For the
above reasons, the Mineta plan appears to best further the goals
of a noise abatement financing scheme; therefore, it should be
re-introduced for serious consideration by the Ninety-Fifth Congress.

